would be needed to maintain any semblance of peace, and that force would be required to stay not for months but for years, and perhaps decades.

This is not an outcome I can support. We were told by the President that we were only going to be in Bosnia for 1 year. Four years later, we are still there and there is little sign that Bosnian peace can survive without a military presence to maintain that peace.

I think it was shortsighted of the Administration to allow cruise missile production to end and to initiate a conflict without an adequate inventory. That same shortsightedness marks our foreign policy. And the result today is that we are engaged in a conflict, with NATO's credibility on the line.

I believe the only solution to the crisis in Kosovo is to re-engage the Serbs in diplomatic negotiations. Most importantly, we need to recognize that the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans have a long history and the people living there may never live in peace so long as the borders are drawn as they are today. Unfortunate as this may be, it may ultimately become necessary to redraw some of those borders in the Balkans to reflect political and ethnic realities.

Mr. President, I came across an article written by David Greenberg. Mr. Greenberg writes the History Lesson column for Slate and is a Richard Hofstadter fellow in American history at Columbia University.

This particular article poses the question, What solution does history dictate for Kosovo?

I thought it an excellent treaty on the history and background. Knowing the Presiding Officer's familiarity with this particular subject, I will read this article into the RECORD at this time.

Mr. Greenberg writes:

Ever since the United States began contemplating doing something about war and ethnic cleansing in the collapsing state of Yugoslavia in 1991, all sides have invoked history as a guide to action. Those who opposed involvement in Bosnia in the early '90s—and who doubt that NATO can bring peace to Kosovo today—argue that the long record of intractable ethnic tension among the Balkan peoples means we should stay out. Any settlement, they say, is doomed to be temporary. Robert Kaplan's book ''Balkan Ghosts,'' which advances this thesis regarding Bosnia, reportedly convinced President Clinton to steer clear of military action there for a time.

Interventionists also invoke history. They note the longstanding claim of ethnic Albanians to the territory of Kosovo dating back to 1200 B.C., when the Albanians' supposed ancestors, the Illyrians, settled there. This ancient history forms the basis of demands for self-determination on the part of the long-suffering Albanian Kosovars. But the Serbs, too, stake a historical claim. Their Slavic forebears migrated to Kosovo around A.D. 500, and they contend that Serbs have lived there ever since.

In fact, each of these assertions is subject to qualification, as is made clear in Noel Malcolm's masterly (but misnamed) ''Kosovo: A Short History'' (my main source along with Hugh Poulton's ''The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict''). The tie of today's Albanian Kosovars to the ancient Illyrians is fairly attenuated. And while Slavs did move into the area around 500, when the Bulgarian Empire conquered the Balkans, the Serbs didn't gain control of Kosovo until the 12th century, when a dynasty of their leaders known as the Nemanjids invaded it after a period of Byzantine rule.

For two centuries the Nemanjids basked in their Balkan kingdom. Serb nationalists today are fond of noting that in 1389 it was in Kosovo that the Serbian Prince Lazar and his armies made their last stand against the invading Ottoman Empire at the Battle of Kosovo. They're less likely to note that the Albanians of Kosovo fought alongside them. (Explicit references to the Albanian people as opposed to the Illyrians begin to appear around the 11th century.)

During Turkey's 500-year rule, most of Kosovo's Albanians—and Albania's Albanians, also subjects of the Ottoman Empire—converted to Islam. The Serbs remained Orthodox Christians. That may be one reason that the Serbs sought independence first. In 1804 they rose up and in 1828 broke free. Kosovo, however, remained largely content under Turkish rule. Serbs, believing that Kosovo still rightfully belonged to them, did briefly conquer it in 1877 when, along with Russia, the new Serbian state made war on Turkey. But under the Russian-Ottoman armistice a year later, Serbia was forced to withdraw.

At this point, the Albanians—of both Kosovo and Albania proper—commenced their so-called ''national awakening.'' A group called the League of Prizren, named for the Kosovo town where it met, lobbied for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. A generation later, this movement flowered into insurrection, as Albanians throughout the western pocket of the Balkans revolted. Albania secured statehood in 1912, but before the status of Kosovo could be resolved, the entire region was rocked, in quick succession by the First Balkan War (1912), the Second Balkan War (1913) and, for good measure, World War I (1914–18).

First to invade Kosovo in these years were the Serbs. The Serbs were knocked out by the Austrians, who were knocked out by the French. The French handed the province back to their allies the Serbs. After the war, the Allies, following Wilsonian ideals of self-determination, straightened up Europe into tidy nation-states. With minimal thought on the part of the mapmakers, Kosovo was folded into Serbia, which joined five neighboring Balkan territories to form the new state of Yugoslavia. Albania appealed to the Allies for control of Kosovo but, considered an insignificant state, was rebuffed in deference to Serbian claims.

As the largest republic in the multinational state, Serbia dominated Yugoslavia. Its capital of Belgrade, for example, was the nation's capital too. Under Serbian rule, Kosovo again became a battleground.

In the late 19th century, Serbian nationalists had built up national myths about the heroics of Prince Lazar and cast Kosovo's status as a Jerusalem-like holy land populated with Orthodox religious shrines. Throughout the 1920s and '30s, the central government in Belgrade pushed Albanians out of the region and moved Serbs in—efforts the Albanian majority resisted, often to their peril.

In World War II, Kosovo again resembled Europe's Grand Central Station. The Axis powers rolled in and carved up the region: Albania's Fascist government, headed by a puppet of Mussolini's, seized the biggest chunk, while Bulgaria and Germany each occupied a strip. Communist partisans retook the province in 1944, and when the war ended, the partisan leader Josip Broz Tito became dictator of the reconstituted Yugoslav federation. The Communists considered ceding Kosovo to Albania but instead decided that it should revert to its antebellum status quo. They deemed Kosovo not an autonomous republic but a province of Serbia.

In the name of Yugoslav unity, Tito suppressed most assertions of ethnic identity. He jailed or killed thousands of Albanian Kosovars and banned Albanian-language publications. But he was, to some degree, an equal opportunity tyrant: He also halted Serbian efforts to settle Kosovo. In 1968, with uprisings sweeping the globe, student protests triggered a wave of demands for greater Kosovar autonomy. Tito acceded to a series of reforms, culminating in a new Yugoslav Constitution in 1974, which gave Kosovo control over much of its internal affairs. That year marked the high point for Kosovar aspirations to independence, and it remains the benchmark for NATO's demand at Rambouillet for a restoration of Kosovo's ''pre-1989'' autonomy.

Tito died in 1980. The next year, Albanian Kosovar students erupted again, with some Kosovars clamoring for republichood. Belgrade, no longer restrained by Tito's aversion to exacerbating ethnic conflict, cracked down. Polarization followed: Slobodan Milosevic—first as a Communist and then as a Serbian nationalist—whipped up anti-Albanian sentiment. In 1989, he stripped Kosovo of its cherished autonomy. Meanwhile, Albanian Kosovars proclaimed their territory a republic and, through channels violent and nonviolent, sought actual independence. Unrelenting, Milosevic undertook the massacres of the last year, which finally precipitated NATO's bombing.

That, in a nutshell, is the history of Kosovo. If you can find a solution to today's mess in there, let me know. Take a snapshot at 1200 B.C. and the Albanians can claim it; look at A.D. 1200 and it's a Serbian kingdom. The United States prefers to use the 1974 benchmark. Milosevic points to 1989. But even at those points, the snapshot looks pretty blurry.

Before NATO began bombing Yugoslavia March 24, the proposed Rambouillet solution—restoring Kosovo's autonomy but not granting it independence—seemed like a plausible outcome. Now it's hard to imagine Kosovars accepting any kind of Serbian rule. If victorious, NATO may grant Kosovo independence or perhaps divide it up. History won't decide Kosovo's fate. Our actions in the weeks ahead will decide history.

I bring this to the attention of my colleagues simply to highlight a little history and point to the complexities in reaching a resolution to this very difficult foreign policy question.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. VOINOVICH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. COLLINS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

## UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT—S. 531

Mr. VOINOVICH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that at 4:30 the Banking Committee be discharged from further consideration of S. 531 and

the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration under the following limitations:

One hour for debate equally divided between Senator ABRAHAM and the ranking member. No amendments or motions will be in order.

I further ask consent that following the use or yielding back of time, the bill be read for a third time at 5:30 this afternoon and that the Senate proceed to vote on passage of the bill with no intervening action or debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. VOINOVICH. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## THE WAR IN KOSOVO

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, President Clinton has just signified his intention to ask Congress for additional appropriations of some $5.45 billion for military costs involved in the war in Kosovo and some $491 million to pay for humanitarian assistance. It is my thought that Congress will be receptive to humanitarian aid for the thousands of refugees who have been driven from their homes in Kosovo. These requests will give us an opportunity to ask some very important questions and get some very important information to assess our military preparedness and to make the determination as to how much our allies are contributing to this effort, which ought to be a joint effort.

We have seen the U.S. military preparedness decline very markedly in the past decade and a half. During the Reagan years, in the mid-1980s, the defense budget exceeded $300 billion. In 1999 dollars, that would be well over $400 billion, might even by close to the $500 million mark. But our budget for this year, fiscal year 1999, was $271 billion, and according to the President's request, is projected to be slightly over $280 billion for fiscal year 2000.

That raises some very, very important questions as to the adequacy of our defense and our ability to deal with a crisis in Kosovo, where we are at war, notwithstanding the fact that a declaration has not been filed. The Senate of the United States has authorized air strikes in our vote of 58 to 41 on March 23, but the House of Representatives has not had a correlating move. Constitutionally this is a very, very dangerous situation, because only the Congress under our Constitution has the authority to declare war. We have seen a constant erosion of congressional authority, which is a dangerous sign, in terms of the requirements of constitutional law—this is bedrock constitutional law—and also in terms of having congressional support, which reflects public support, for the military action.

We have seen this war in Kosovo move ahead. We have seen missile strikes, air strikes. The authorization of the Senate was limited in the air strikes because of our concern about not putting too many U.S. fighting men and women in so-called harm's way. It is rather a surprising consequence to find we are in short supply of missiles. We have seen the activity in Iraq reduced, according to military reports. We know of our commitments around the globe, including South Korea. I believe this is an occasion to take a very close look as to the adequacy of our military preparations. At this time, we have some 10 divisions, 20 wings active in reserve, some 13 active wings and some 256 naval service combatants. This is very limited, compared to the power of the United States during the mid-1980s in the Reagan years.

Of course, it is a different world. It is a world without the potential clash of the superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—but it is still a world with major, major problems.

When the President comes to Capitol Hill, comes to the Appropriations Committee on which I serve, comes to the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on which I serve, then I think we need to ask some very, very hard questions. Those questions turn on whether the United States is, realistically, capable of carrying on the kind of a war in which we have become engaged in Kosovo. Do we even have sufficient air power to carry out our objectives? Do we have sufficient missiles to carry out our objectives?

So far, we have bypassed the issue of ground forces. Some of our colleagues have advocated a resolution which would authorize the President to use whatever force is needed. I am categorically opposed to such a resolution. I do not believe that the Senate and the Congress of the United States ought to give the President a blank check, but I am prepared to hear whatever it is that the President requests, to consider that in the context of our vital national security interests and in the context of what we ought to do. But at a time when the Congress and the country has been put on notice that the President is considering calling up Reserves, we find ourselves in a military entanglement, a foreign entanglement and, by all appearances, we are ill-equipped to carry out the objectives and the course which the President has set out for us.

We need to know on an updated basis what is happening in Iraq and what our commitments are there and what our potential commitments are around the world.

Similarly, we need to know, Madam President, our allies' contributions. At a time when the Congress of the United States is being called upon to authorize $5.450 billion for the Pentagon, it is fair to ask what the contribution is from Great Britain. What is the contribution from France? What is the contribution from Germany? What is the contribution from the other NATO countries?

The morning news reports carried the comment that the French are opposed to a naval blockade to cut off Yugoslavian oil reserves. That is sort of a surprising matter. As General Wesley Clark has noted, why are we putting U.S. pilots at risk in bombing Yugoslavian oil production at oil refineries if we are not willing to take on a less drastic matter of a naval blockade? Certainly a naval blockade is an act of war, as the French have been reported to have said, but so are missile and air strikes. As we are being asked for almost $6 billion, I would be especially interested to know the French contribution, besides their naysaying of a naval blockade to stop petroleum from reaching Yugoslavia.

The issue of the relative contribution of the United States and the NATO countries has been a longstanding controversy for the 50 years that NATO has been in existence. I recall attending my first North Atlantic Assembly meeting in Venice shortly after I was elected. It was the spring of 1981. The chief topic was burden sharing.

On the occasions when I have had an opportunity to return to North Atlantic Assembly meetings, burden sharing has always been a big question. I think it is a fair question for the Congress to ask: What is the proportion of burden sharing now in Kosovo, especially when we are being asked to ante up an additional $6 billion.

There is another aspect to our activity in Kosovo which requires an answer, and that is, what are we doing with respect to prosecution of crimes against humanity in the War Crimes Tribunal, looking toward the prospective indictment of President Milosevic. There is an active effort at the present time to gather evidence against President Milosevic. There is a question as to why it has taken so long. In late 1992, then-Secretary of State Eagleburger, pretty much branded Milosevic a war criminal. There has been constant speculation over the course of the past 7 years about why Milosevic was not indicted, along with others in the Bosnia and Croatia crimes against humanity.

We need an answer, Madam President, as to what has happened with outstanding key indictments against Mladic and Karadzic with respect to what has happened in Bosnia. When a group of Members of the House and Senate were briefed by the President last Tuesday, a distinction was made between our military activity and collateral ways to have an impact on the war in Kosovo, such as through the War Crimes Tribunal.

There have been major efforts to locate Karadzic. There have also been major efforts to locate Mladic who is supposed to be in hiding near Belgrade.

The activities of the War Crimes Tribunal could have a very profound effect